Friday, April 30, 2010

Cochrane, Booth School: Too big to fail is the key to 'crisis'

We are left with only one plausible explanation for why
Lehman’s failure could have had such wide-ranging effect:
After the Bear Stearns bailout earlier in the year, markets
came to the conclusion that investment banks and bank
holding companies were “too big to fail” and would be bailed
out. But when the government did not bail out Lehman, and
in fact said it lacked the legal authority to do so, everyone
reassessed that expectation. “Maybe the government will not,
or cannot, bail out Citigroup?” Suddenly, it made perfect
sense to run like mad...

Once everyone expects a bailout, government has to provide
it or else chaos will result.Obviously, in this view there is nothing
inherently “systemic” about the behavior of Lehman
Brothers or other large banks.What is systemic is the expectation
of a bailout. The policy question is simply how to
escape this horrible moral-hazard trap.

The tarp mess did not help. Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and
President Bush got on television and said, basically, “The
financial system is about to collapse. We are in danger of an
economic calamity worse than the Great Depression. We
need $700 billion, and we won’t tell you what we’re going to
do with it. If you need a hint, we justmade it illegal to shortsell
bank stocks.”

These speeches should be remembered as a case study in
how to start a financial crisis, not how to relieve one....

Tett, Garnham: the carry trade



The carry trade has been “one of the principal methods in which debtor nations have been able to recycle their deficits over the past 40 years”, says Neil Record of Record Currency Management, a specialist adviser. “Surplus countries have historically offered their citizens lower short-term interest rates than deficit countries, and this has encouraged these citizens to seek higher returns – and therefore investment risk – elsewhere.”

... central banks loosened monetary policy to tackle the global financial crisis, some investors have used this cheap, short-term funding to make big bets on higher-yielding assets, ranging from Brazilian shares to American mortgage bonds...

Mr Lee thinks many of the investors he tracks have switched out of yen carry trades into the dollar in the past couple of years. He calculates that there are some $500bn-$750bn of dollar-based carry trades in the global financial system, plus $250bn-odd funded in other currencies.

Others have even bigger estimates. “To me the big risk this year is the dollar carry trade,” Zhu Min, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, said recently, adding that there was now a real risk of a violent unwinding. “It is a massive issue. Estimates are that the dollar carry trade is $1,500bn – which is much bigger than Japan’s carry trade was.”

Jackson on governance

Still, let us pursue the argument. It seems clear that the gap – the so-called agency problem – has indeed been widening in the developed world in recent years.

One main reason for that has been the extreme dispersion of the shareholder base. That in turn has various causes, ranging from the reduced involvement of domestic life and pension funds to the advent of high-frequency trading.

But, taken with the globalisation of big companies’ shareholder registers, this can make boards unclear on what the owners want, or indeed who they are. And that can create uncertainty and short-termism in strategy.

Added to that, the big institutions have farmed out their investing to fund managers, thus further attenuating the link between board and owners. And market regulation has, with the best intentions, in effect stifled communication. Boards can only talk to the owners once a quarter, through official announcements. Anything they say in between can only be repetition.

Compare the eastern model, where companies are largely owned and controlled by governments or their sovereign wealth funds. The resulting conduct of boards, according to one veteran UK banker with experience in Singapore, can be “chillingly effective”.

Friday, April 23, 2010

Politi: Fed adds $47.4bn to Treasury coffers

The Federal Reserve sent $47.4bn of its 2009 profits to the US Treasury, a record payment that highlights how the US central bank was able to turn its huge intervention to rescue the financial system into a successful investment.

In annual results released yesterday, the Fed said earnings rose 50 per cent last year to $53.4bn (€40bn, £34.7bn), driven mainly by profits incurred from interest revenues on the extensive portfolio of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) it bought to prop up the stricken housing market...Over the past decade or so, Fed repayments to the Treasury have averaged about $25bn per year, US central bank officials said.

Beattie: Trade recovery fragile..

The (ICC) report focused on trade finance - the form of credit which, in effect, insures against the importer crashing while goods are in transit - whose price rose sharply in 2008 as the global financial crisis took hold.

Amid fears that the machinery of world trade would seize up, multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, launched lending programmes to try to catalyse a revival in trade credit.

"The costs of trade finance remain substantially higher than they were pre-crisis, raising the problem of affordability for exporters," the chamber said. Some 30 per cent of respondents indicated an increase in fees for commercial letters of credit and other instruments.

Banks said customers were requiring higher levels of insurance when dealing with their trading partners - demanding confirmed letters of credit rather than taking payments more on trust...

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

China is the key to unwinding new global imbalances

...But emerging economies will want to moderate inflows of capital both for macroprudential reasons and to avoid becoming uncompetitive due to rising currency values. What should they do? The only two real options are capital controls and currency appreciation. But what is becoming clear is that the landscape is rife with beggar-thy-neighbour possibilities. For example, if some countries restrict capital, there is the risk that capital gets diverted to others, increasing pressure on them. And competitive non-appreciation - the revealed preference of many emerging economies given that their main trade competitor, China, has a fixed exchange rate - imposes large systemic costs, of global overheating and excess liquidity creation, as reserves pile up around the world...

van Duyn: consumer securitization revival

Even after the Fed's programme - the Talf - ended in March, several new securities backed by auto loans and other types of receivables have been sold to investors. Yet asset-backed securities (ABS) markets remain a fraction of their former selves - limiting the availability of credit.

Global ABS volumes, which excludes mortgage-backed securities, year-to-date are at their lowest since 1995, according to Dealogic. This is down even from 2009 - when many capital markets were still in crisis - and is 90 per cent lower than the $349bn raised in 2007. Uncertainty about future regulations and the lack of investor confidence in these types of securities continues...